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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MAVOR JEAN CARNES, . . 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
. 
. 
. 
. Case No. 18370 
CLIFF CARNES, 
Defendant-Appellant. . . 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
The appellant files this brief in response to the brief 
filed by the respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ordinarily resort to the record is the best method to 
resolve disputes as to the facts of a case and ultimately that 
will prove to be the case with this appeal. However, the re-
spondent's statement of facts contains one glaring inaccuracy 
or omission which must be spotlighted because it may affect 
the Court's decision. 
The respondent contends that in an early hearing in this 
matter Judge Taylor of the Third Judicial District ruled that 
the respondent could have judgment upon filing "a proof of ser-
vice," rrom the Florida court file, (respondent's brief, p.4):. 
She then recites that some five months later she did file a 
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return and after another month she filed a supplemental affida-
vit from the same deputy which again purported to show service 
upon the appellant. She concludes by stating that after the 
filing of these returns Judge Dee, having no other alternative 
under Judge Taylor's order, entered judgment for her. Respon-
dent has apparently forgotten a crucial state in these prodeedings. 
After the respondent filed her return, but before filing 
her supplemental affidavit, she again renewed her motion for 
judgment. The Court reviewed the return which was first pre-
pared six months after the Florida hearing, one month after 
the action on the resulting judgment was filed in Utah, was 
not filed in Florida until one year after the hearing held there 
and some two months after Judge Taylor ruled such proof to be 
necessary. The Court concluded at this hearing, which is not 
mentioned by respondent, that it would not grant judgment on 
the basis of the return alone but would require additional proof. 
This is precisely the reason why respondent found it necessary 
to file a "supplemental" affidavit, why another hearing was held, 
and why appellant was given leave by the Court to file his own 
memorandum and affidavit denying he was served. Thus the issue 
framed before the lower court is not merely technical defects 
in the return of service but whether, when all the facts are 
considered, the appellant was served at all. 
ARGUMENT 
Three claims made by the respondent warrant a response. 
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First, it is contended that the appellant's affidavit was un-
timely and therefore the lower court did not consider it and 
entered judgment accordingly. Second, if the affidavit was 
considered it was legally insufficient. Finally, it is claimed 
that the case is now somehow moot in light of a subsequent de-
cision by the trial court. Each of these arguments is wholly 
without merit. 
The claim is made that the appellant's affidavit denying 
service was untimely because it was filed six months ater re-
spondent made her motion for judgment on the pleadings. The 
claim is destroyed, however, by three fatal defects. First, 
the respondent never raised the claim of untimeliness in the 
lower court. This Court has frequently ruled that defenses not 
raised in the trial court cannot be considered for the first 
time on appeal, In Re Jones' Estate, 104 P.2d 210 (Utah 1940); 
Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, 604 P.2d 775 (Utah 1980). The Court 
has extended the rule to the issue of "timeliness," refusing 
to consider the statutes of limitations or laches when first 
raised on appeal, Westerfield v. Coop, 311 P.2d 787 (Utah 1957); 
Utah Assets Corporation v. Dooley Bros., 70 P.2d 738 (1937); 
and In Re Jones' Estate, supra. The same rules must be adhered 
to in the present case since respondent never raised the issue. 
The next defect in the respondent's timeliness claim is 
that it ignores the form of her own motion. Respondent's motion 
began as one for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12 
-3-
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U.R.C.P. A counter-affidavit filed at that time would have 
been irrelevant since the only issue before the court was the 
contents of the pleadings. An affidavit from the appellant be-
came appropriate only after the respondent filed an affidavit 
in support of her own claims on February 16, 1982, thus con-
verting the motion to one for summary judgment. Within ten days 
thereafter the appellant filed his own affidavit. 
The final reason the timeliness claim must fail is that 
after the respondent "short-noticed" the appellant by giving him 
three less days than the mandated ten to respond to her motion, 
the lower court specifically gave appellant leave to file such 
affidavits as he desired. 
The next claim made by respondent is that the appellant's 
affidavit is insufficient because it contains the "legal con-
clusion" he was never served. This claim is ludicrous. It is 
obvious that the appellant meant "never served" to by synonymous 
with "never received." Appellant clearly stated he never re-
sided at the home the deputy claimed to have served him and when 
the deputy changed his story to claim he served him at work, 
appellant submitted proof he was not at work that entire week. 
The final claim, and the most offensive, is the claim 
that this appeal is now moot in some way because the lower court 
issued a later ruling permitting the respondent to enforce a 
Florida divorce decree in this state. No authority is cited for 
this proposition, the respondent merely resorts to character 
-4-
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assassination claiming appellant is a wealthy man who refuses 
to pay alimony to his wife. These allegations are only an 
attempt to cloud the issue before the Court, whether service 
occurred, and gain sympathy for the respondent to divert the 
Court from the truth. It is sufficient to say that appellant 
has affirmative defenses to these charges, defenses the lower 
court correctly ruled could not be asserted to the judgment but 
could be asserted to the alleged ongoing obligation. The claims 
regarding the actions of the appellant are offensive because the 
respondent well knows that owing to the lower court ruling con-
cerning his defenses to the judgment he has no way to defend him-
self. However, if respondent is correct in her allegations then 
she should not fear having the judgment reversed and giving appel-
!ant his day in court. 
CONCLUSION. 
It has been claimed by respondent that mere technicalities 
are involved here and thus the judgment below should be sustained. 
Those technicalities, service of process and an opportunity to be 
heard, are the very foundation for our system of justice. The 
question of service must be returned for a full hearing. 
DATED this r 
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Appel-
lant's Brief Reply was delivered via TRS to John D. Parken and 
Paul H. Proctor, 430 Ten Broadway Building, 10 West Third South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this ( Q day of 1982. 
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